In this paper, I analyze the place of the Metaphysics of morals in the Kantian system. I claim that this work is the passage between a pure part of ethics and a practical anthropology. Although this book was first conceived to be a pure moral theory -moralia pura-, it ended up dealing with principle of applications of the moral law to sensible moral beings-philosophia moralis applicata. I also hold that the Doctrine of Virtue presents some sensible elements that are important to understand how morality affects us.
Metaphysics of morals and principles of application
In the introduction to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, we are confronted by a clear separation between metaphysics and empirical psychology. Ethics is divided into metaphysics of morals and practical anthropology. After introducing the three basic sciences since the Greeks; physics, ethics and logic, Kant states that the first and second ones deal with objects, while the third is formal. We have a science of the laws of nature and a science of the laws of freedom, both admitting a pure and empirical part. Physics has an empirical part but also a rational one, metaphysics of nature. In ethics, its empirical side is named practical anthropology and its pure side metaphysics of morals. (GMS, AA 4:388) . The latter provides us with the law according to which everything must happen, while the former provides us with information regarding human nature, which should be obtained by another professional (not a philosopher) who should search only for the first principles.
Two observations should be made here. First, in this text from 1785, the empirical realm does not refer to an empirical psychology such as in the 1770's Lectures on Metaphysics. This does not mean that empirical psychology was banned from the realm of moral philosophy, but instead that it was incorporated into practical anthropology. One of the proofs of this incorporation is the statement in Critique of Pure Reason regarding the probable destiny of an http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017v16n3p423 ethic@ -Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil, v. 16, n. 3, p. 423 -436. Dez. 2017
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empirical psychology, as long as it could abandon its provisory refuge: "It is thus merely a longacepted foreigner, to whom one grants refuge for a while until it can establish its own domicile in a complete anthropology". (KrV, A 849, B 877 Metaphysics of morals cannot be based on anthropology, but should be able to be applied to it.
Kant seems to implicitly answer the later critique addressed to him regarding the ineffectiveness of his practical theory: he really had no intention of creating principles which could not be applied to human nature; although the source of the principle should be based on reason alone.
The application of the moral principle to the human being, so as to determine, for example, particular duties of virtue, requires the examination of a few particularities of human nature.
The determination of these particularities which are morally relevant to human nature will tell us whether or not moral law can be effective. "The counterpart of a metaphysics of morals, the other member of the division of practical philosophy as a whole "-Kant states-"would be moral anthropology, which, however, would deal only with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals. (MS, AA 6: 217).
The concept of pragmatic Anthropology
The he advocates that children, especially girls, be accustomed to broad and frank smiles, because joy expressed in the facial features will gradually imprint in their interior a disposition to joy and sociability (Anth, 7:265) . Another curious and perhaps very innovative comment as regards the feminine sex: he accepts coqueterie, in other words, the social flirtation between a married woman and other men, since a young wife always runs the risk of becoming widowed, which leads to her distributing her charms to would-be suitors in case such a fact occurred (Anth, AA 7: 219).
Some other comments are quite illustrative concerning the sociability of the time. Such is the case of the rules to be followed during a reception. For a good reception, the guests must be a minimum of three and a maximum of ten people; conversation during dinner must follow three stages: narration, argumentation and pleasantries. This third stage is appropriate, since the guests have already eaten plentifully and argumentation requires a lot of energy, no longer available due to the requirements of digestion.
In the which seems to be the object of a moral metaphysics: a practical anthropology, in other words, the nature of the rational sensitive being.
The impure part of ethics
Kantian moral theory has a pure part and another part which, by contrast, we may call impure. According to those lectures, methaphysica pura is only the first part of morals-the second part is philosophia moralis applicata, moral anthropology, to which the empirical principles belong. The particular nature of the human being and the laws upon which it is based provide the content of a moral anthropology.
Once these two parts of Kantian ethics have been accepted, our problem becomes finding the texts which discuss metaphysica pura and those which express philosophia moralis applicata. In his recent book, Kant's Impure Ethics, Robert Louden provides an important contribution to this discussion. Louden's book comes to show that aside from pure, nonempirical principles, Kant offers an Ethics which is not pure. This part was named, by Kant himself, as "moral anthropology", "practical anthropology" or "moral applied philosophy".
The book Anthropology from a Pragmatic
These terms refer to the empirical study of the human being, which Louden refers to as impure Ethics, in order to contrast with pure Ethics, consisting of a priori, non-empirical principles.
Louden does not deny that the pure part of Ethics provides the foundation to practical Kantian philosophy and is, thus, more important than the "impure" part. However, the author calls attention to the fact that Kant dedicated many of his writings and lessons to the empirical study of the human being, which would be necessary for the application of those principles.
The pure and impure parts of Kantian ethics, according to Louden, are both necessary and complementary. Disregarding the latter would not only be to disregard an important part of Kant's work, but also to offer material to critique and irony in relation to a practical philosophy blind to the peculiarities of the human being and, therefore, to the applicability of his principles. action to be moral, however, the pure principle, in other words, non-empirical, must be the foundation of the determination of the will.
Louden presents a classification which he named "fields of impurity": education, anthropology, art, religion and history. These fields of impurity are not about the physiological or psychological study of man, as Kant had already forewarned in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, but refer to what man has done with his own nature through the use of his freedom. Thus, the study of pedagogy refers to the strategy of moral education through the training of the abilities required for practical judging. In the Anthropology, we can also see the importance of the universality of Kantian ethics, even in the studies of the racial and gender subgroups. In the Kantian account of art and religion, we see how aesthetic appreciation serves the purposes of morality and how religious institutions help to create a global moral community.
In history, the concept of historical progress as a development towards a cosmopolitan society is emphasized.
One of the most brilliant points of Louden's approach is the idea of levels of impurity of Kantian ethics, since Kant's ethics is not composed only of a pure and an impure level, but also by the application of principles of the former towards the latter, and by the determination of specific duties of rational sensitive beings.
The first level of Kantian Ethics, according to Louden, is pure Ethics. According to Kant's statement in Critique of Pure Reason, "pure morality (...) contains merely the necessary moral law of free will in general" (KrV, A 55). On this level of total abstraction, no information regarding the peculiar nature of the human being or of another rational being is given. However, not even the Groundwork itself would fit into a pure Ethics in this more strict sense, since this text discusses subjective limitations and obstacles, as well as the way in which moral law should be received as an imperative, which is not valid for every rational being. If the determination of the specific duties of human beings is an object of Metaphysics, however, the specific study of the human peculiarities which assist or hinder the exercise of morality will be the object of a practical or moral anthropology, as the text establishes at various moments (MS, AA 6:217).
What is the specific locus of moral anthropology? The answer to that should answer the following questions: What are the passions and tendencies which hinder or assist adherence to moral principles? How should these principles be taught to human beings? How can political, cultural and religious institutions be organized so that they can realize moral objectives? Are there specific aspects of modern time which assist in the establishment and development of morality?
The Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, especially in its first part, answers the first question. The pedagogical texts, along with the texts on religion and history, appear to be the right place to answer the other questions of moral anthropology. On the other hand, the second part of the Anthropology presents a more specific description of subgroups within the human species, which implies a more detailed empirical knowledge than what is necessary in a moral anthropology.
The most specific degree of empirical knowledge in Kant is given when we ask what to do in a certain situation. Kantian philosophy, as we know, does not tell us what to do in a certain situation; in that sense, we are now already outside the Kantian system. However, he occupies himself with these questions in at least two texts. In the Lessons on Pedagogy, he recommends that the teacher should teach a moral catechism to the students, through casuistic questions.
Such practice would serve to the development of the capacity for moral judgment in young people. Kant equally dedicates a few passages of Metaphysics of Morals to casuistry. He then discusses matters relative to sexuality, consumption of toxic substances, alcohol abuse and the correct degree of inebriation allowed at parties. Even if casuistry is not a part of science or a moral doctrine, it assists in the practice of moral judgment, which is especially needed for the fulfillment of imperfect duties.
Doctrine of Virtue and moral sensibility
In The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant presents three central moments of the impure part of Ethics, in which he analyses moral sensibility as an important part of the Metaphysics of morals.
First, Kant claims that one should cultivate natural feelings, such as sympathy, in order to realize benevolent actions, which appears to contradict the praise of the cold philanthropist found in Groundwork. Second, he shows the relation between morality and feelings, especially the idea of aesthetical presuppositions of the reception of duty. And as a third important moment, he develops a theory regarding how to handle emotions-be it through cultivation or control. He points to the possibility to control them through the strength of virtue.
The sensitive aspects of morality can be noticed in the conditional duty of promoting sympathy. Kant defines sympathy as follow: "Sympathetic joy and sadness (Mitfreunde und Mitleid) (sympathia moralis) are sensible feelings of pleasure and displeasure (which are therefore to be called "aesthetic") at another's state of joy or pain "(MS, AA 6:456).We have a duty to cultivate these sympathetic feelings in order to promote benevolence. If the moral law cannot be an objectively sufficient motive and a subjectively sufficient incentive, there is an indirect duty of strengthening a few natural sentiments which can help in acting according to duty.
It is therefore a duty not to avoid the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found, but rather to seek them out, and not to shun sickrooms or debtors's prisons and so forth in order to avoid sharing painful feelings one may not be able to resist. For this is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish". (TL, AA 6:457) The cultivation of sympathy seems to fulfill the role of a moral incentive when the law is not sufficient to promote the moral action. In the impure part of Ethics, therefore, a few sentiments which did not have moral value in Groundwork now have it. Part of this is due to the distinction between active and passive sympathy. The active sympathy of the Doctrine of Virtues may correspond to what in the Anthropology is denominated sensitivity (Empfindsamkeit).
Apparently, it is suggested that sympathetic feelings connected to sensitivity can be cultivated, 4
while their passive version, the affects (Affekten), are uncontrollable by reason and would just hinder the realization of the moral action.
Besisdes sympathy, there is also the idea of aesthetical presuppositions for the susceptibility of the mind to the concept of duty (Ästhetishe The most important of these presuppositions is moral feeling, defined as "the susceptibility to feel pleasure and displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty". (TL, AA 6:399) . This feeling can be pathological or moral; in the first case, it seems to precede the representation of law. In the second, it is posterior to the law, and is an effect of a concept regarding the faculty of feeling pleasure or displeasure.
Since it refers to a natural predisposition of the mind to be affected by the concept of duty, we are in the realm of practical anthropology and no longer of metaphysica pura. This natural predisposition is a fact about human nature: "No human being is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely lacking in receptivity to it he would be morally dead" (MS, AA 6:399).
Moral feeling is distinct from both respect and from the moral sense of the Empiricists.
The feeling of respect is just a feeling of fear and displeasure, while the moral feeling can be a feeling of pleasure, when our actions are in conformity with the law of duty. This aspect of pleasure answers, in a way, Schiller's famous jocular poem, in which he states that Kant taught him to do with repulsion the good he used to do with pleasure. What is not explained, however, is whether moral feeling is the feeling of respect through the feeling of pleasure, or whether it is a new feeling. Regardless, it is not the Empiricists' moral feeling (moral sense), because it does not give us a moral law, but follows the law given by reason. We have the obligation to cultivate and strengthen this feeling as part of virtue, but it will never tell us what we should do.
The third important aspect is the interpretation of passions and affects as illnesses of the mind. This would be compatible with the idea that we have strong inclinations-be they affects the subject blind (Anth, AA 7:253), while passion is a river which digs ever deeper into its riverbed, and it is a permanent atrophy (Anth, AA 7: 252).
In paragraph XIV of Doctrine of Virtue, it is explained that affections and passions encumber moral reflection and deliberation:
Affects belong to feeling (Gefühl) insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible or more difficult. (...) A passion is a sensible desire that has become a lasting inclination (e.g. hatred as opposed to anger). The calm with which one gives oneself up to it permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles upon it and so, if inclination lights upon something contrary to the law, to brood upon it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take uo what is evil (as something premeditated) into its maxim. And the evil is then properly evil, that is, a true vice. (MS, XV, Affects and passions are impediments to the moral life; however, if affects, such as anger, momentarily hinder and impede reflection, passions, such as hatred, with the calmness of reflection, form maxims which are contrary to the law, making us have a real vice, an evil which does not only accrue from weakness but from consciously taking up non-moral motives in maxims.
Kant appears to be skeptical regarding the possibility of cultivating emotions. We can see it both in the jocular comment in Anthropology regarding Socrates, 5 as in the Doctrine of Virtue itself: "for moral maxims, unlike technical ones, cannot be based on habit" (TL, AA 6:409). The idea of strength thus ends up replacing the impossible cultivation and apathy: virtue contains a positive demand; to place all of your abilities under the control of reason, which goes beyond forbidding that the subject be governed by his feelings and inclinations, as these may dominate him if virtue does not take control of them. Aristotelian cultivation and stoic apathy are not enough to fight inclinations. A strong adversary, who does not merely let itself be tamed, must be commanded and controlled. For this reason, virtue is not apathy, but the capability and reflected-upon decision to resist the temptations of sensibility.
Conclusion
The proof that beings with will and reason, whoever they may be, are subjected to moral law is independent of specific considerations regarding how the human being is affected.
However, in order to show that ought implies can, in other words, that rational beings can act according to what duty orders, Kant needs to show how the moral law affects them.
The ability to be a moral agent for humans implies that our sensibility is affected, which is caused by respect and moral emotion. Without these emotions we would be, according to the Kantian expression of The Metaphysics of Morals, "morally dead". Being a moral agent is the possibility of placing feelings such as sympathy in the service of morality, when the mere respect for the law is not capable of being a sufficient motive. And, in order to fight inclinations, which oppose themselves to morality, one must train virtue as an interior strength capable of making one resist the temptations of sensibility, fighting an inherent weakness to a pathologically affected will. The pure part of Ethics must be complemented by its conditions of validity to human beings, which can only be found in a doctrine of moral sensibility.
